We know now that, aside from the humanitarian desires of the public to free the Cubans from an oppressive Spain and the flood of national well-being and unity that came about from the war with Spain, there is also the aspect of trade in the Far East and the need to secure “stepping stones” from which American ships can stop and refuel as well as places for American military establishments to protect American interests and nationals. This aspect has been of paramount importance to the business and political circles in the country. The economic situation at home had forced the businessmen and politicians to look overseas to expand the economy and keep the economy from stagnating.

The defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese war in 1894-95 caused many Americans to believe that China could be persuaded of “the folly of [its] exclusive and conservative policy” (1), thereby allowing American industries to expand into the Far Eastern markets. The current technology in ship propulsion, steam, which requires coal to heat the boilers to create the steam for propulsion limits the range of ships before refueling is needed, thus, the need for “island stepping stones to the major market areas.”(2) It was determined that the Philippines and Guam were vital to the economic goals of the country as a part of the chain connecting the U.S. to Chinese markets. Upon declaration of war Commodore Dewey, commander of the Asiatic squadron, was ordered to “Proceed at once to the Philippine Islands. Commence operations at once, particularly against the Spanish fleet.”(3) This was in accordance with a memorandum written earlier by Assistant Secretary of the Navy Theodore Roosevelt which stated that “in the event of war with Spain, the Asiatic squadron should blockade, and if possible take Manila.”. The intent was to turn the Philippines into a “commercial entrepot to the China market and a center of American military power.”(4) But these acquisitions were not to be the beginnings of an American Imperial expansion but “simply a limited though important accoutrement to commercial expansion” (5) .

Those in power also saw the gains to be had in Cuba as well. They saw that Cuba posed a threat to the stability of the region and that if it was to gain its independence without aid from the U.S., which would incur gratitude from the Cubans, that it could “pass under the influence of a hostile country capable of menacing U.S. interests in the region.”(6) The interference of the U.S. in the independence of Cuba allowed moral grounds for the U.S. to create a “stable and adequate government in Cuba.”(7) By dictating the terms of Cuban independence and the inclusion of the Platt Amendment in the military appropriations bill of 1901 the U.S. could dictate aspects of the Cuban government which could be “deemed most likely to jeopardize U.S. interests.” (8) So, while the public fought for reasons of humanitarian duty to the oppressed masses of Cubans as well as to revenge the destruction of the Main, those in office and the businessmen used the wave of popular opinion to secure for the United States the necessary territories needed to penetrate into the China market and to protect its interests there. By interfering with Cuban independence and incurring a “debt of gratitude”(9) the U.S. also secured the moral right to ensure that Cuban independence did not prove hazardous to American interests in the region.


1. McCormick, Thomas, Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the
Spanish-American War , Pacific Historical Review, 32 (1963) p.156
2. Ibid, 156
3. LUCE, S. B., Rear-Admiral, U. S. N, The Spanish-American War , North American Review,
194:4 (1911:Oct.) p.613
4. McCormick, Thomas, Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the
Spanish-American War , Pacific Historical Review, 32 (1963) p.158
5. McCormick, Thomas, Insular Imperialism and the Open Door: The China Market and the
Spanish-American War , Pacific Historical Review, 32 (1963) p.167
6. Perez, Louis A. Jr. , Incurring a Debt of Gratitude: 1898 and the Moral Sources of United States Hegemony in Cuba. The American Historical Review, 104 (1999) p. 364
7. Ibid, 370
8. Ibid, 371
9. Ibid